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An open foe may prove a curse,
But a pretended friend is worse.
John Gay 1
A recent Supreme Court decision, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 2 leaves un-
certain the state of the law regarding the government's use of jailhouse
informants. It is difficult to determine the standards of permissible gov-
ernment behavior by analyzing Wilson against the background of estab-
lished case law. At first glance, Wilson appears to overrule the preceding
sixth amendment cases.
Three cases are integral to understanding the sixth amendment's
prohibition of government interrogation in the absence of counsel. The
landmark case of Massiah v. United States,3 which was decided in 1964,
concerned evidence obtained when a co-defendant allowed the govern-
ment to install a listening device in his car to monitor his post indictment
conversations with Massiah. The Supreme Court held that this proce-
dure constituted government interrogation which violated Massiah's
sixth amendment right to counsel4 because the government "deliberately
1. Quoted in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (condemning police employment
of defendant's childhood friend to manipulate defendant during interrogation).
2. 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986). See generally Note, Kuhlmann v. Wilson: The Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel: Government Circumvention Through Surreptitious Interrogation, 20 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 567 (1987).
3. 377.U.S. 201, 202-03 (1964).
4. Id. at 206. The Court began expanding the sixth amendment right to counsel in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), which held that a criminal defendant in a capital case who was unable
to present an adequate defense was entitled to the assistance of counsel. Id. at 74. Following Powell,
the Supreme Court initially rejected the notion of an absolute right to counsel during police interro-
gation: Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439-41 (1958) (due process violated only if criminal
defendant is so prejudiced by lack of counsel that basic fairness is denied). The Court reversed its
position and recognized the defendant's right to counsel in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
In Spano, the Court held that a confession obtained through police interrogation was involuntary,
violating due process requirements, if the police denied the defendant's reasonable requests to con-
tact an attorney. Id. at 323-24. The right to counsel at postindictment interrogations was solidified
by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendant entitled to appointed counsel in
noncapital cases), White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (lack of counsel when defendant pled
guilty at preliminary hearing violated due process rights), and Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,
507, 513-15 (1963) (involuntary detention without assistance of counsel during coercive police ques-
tioning violated due process). Massiah was decided against this backdrop.
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elicited [incriminating statements] from him after he had been indicted
and in the absence of his counsel."' 5
In 1977, in Brewer v. Williams, 6 the Court revitalized and expanded
Massiah. In Williams, the police had agreed with defense counsel not to
question Williams while transporting him following his arraignment on a
murder charge. During the trip, an officer told Williams that it would be
necessary to find the body as soon as possible to ensure the victim a chris-
tian burial. This induced Williams to direct the police to the body.7 The
Supreme Court held that the police behavior constituted interrogation
under the Massiah deliberate elicitation standard, and the evidence
should have been suppressed.8
Finally, in United States v. Henry, 9 which the Court decided in
1980, Henry's cellmate had agreed to act as an agent for the government,
listening for Henry to incriminate himself. The agent successfully ob-
tained incriminating information from Henry and testified against him at
trial. The Court found deliberate elicitation under Massiah and Williams
and held the evidence inadmissible. 10
Wilson presented the Court with a fact situation virtually identical
to that of Henry, 11 yet the Court reached the opposite conclusion. The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' determination that Henry
and Wilson were factually indistinguishable and held that the court of
appeals' finding of deliberate elicitation failed to pay proper deference to
the state court findings of fact, which precluded identification of a consti-
tutional violation.12
This note first examines Henry and Wilson and argues that the cases
are factually indistinguishable. 13 It then shows that the Supreme Court's
application of the habeas statute14 created the seemingly inconsistent re-
sults. In Henry, the Court dealt directly with the sixth amendment issues
A few weeks after it decided Massiah, the Court, in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 484-85
(1964), reversed a conviction obtained through an impermissible confession and affirmed allegiance
to Massiah. The Court held that a law enforcement system that depends on confession "will, in the
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." Id. at 489 (citations omitted).
5. 377 U.S. at 206.
6. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
7. Id. at 392-93.
8. Id. at 399-400. The Court held that the right to counsel attaches not only after indictment
but also as soon as adversarial judicial proceedings are initiated. Id. at 401.
9. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
10. Id. at 273-75.
11. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
12. 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
13. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
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raised by the use of jailhouse informants, while in Wilson, the Court
found that its decision was compelled by the statutory requirement that
federal courts respect state courts' factual findings. 15 The note then
surveys the legislative history of the habeas statute16 and notes the confu-
sion created by the Court's attempts to distinguish factual from legal
findings.1 7 The note suggests that the Court's desire to impose finality on
habeas litigation and punish the "actually guilty" affected its treatment
of Wilson.18 Finally, the note argues that the approach taken in Wilson
gives inadequate consideration to federal supremacy and to the rights of
individual defendants. 19
I. THE FACTS OF HENRY AND WILSON
A. United States v. Henry.
In United States v. Henry, 20 the Court addressed the problem of the
jailhouse informant for the first time. Henry was arrested and indicted
after evidence was found linking him to a bank robbery. Shortly after he
was incarcerated, government agents contacted Nichols, a prisoner who
had previously acted as a paid informant for the FBI. Nichols told the
agent that he was housed in the same cellblock as Henry. The agent
instructed Nichols to be alert to any statements made by Henry but not
to initiate any conversations or ask any questions. Nichols later con-
tacted the FBI and informed them that he and Henry had engaged in
conversations and that Henry had told him about the bank robbery.
Nichols was paid for this information. Nichols' testimony was used at
Henry's federal district court trial, and Henry was convicted.21
Henry sought a writ of habeas corpus under the habeas statute for
federal prisoners.22 Henry argued at an evidentiary hearing that the gov-
ernment's behavior constituted interrogation under Massiah, during
which he had been entitled to have counsel present.2 3 The district court,
15. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
20. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
21. Id. at 265-67.
22. Henry v. United States, 551 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977). The habeas statute provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982).
23. 447 U.S. at 267-68.
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however, found that Henry's constitutional rights had not been violated
because the agent, Nichols, had been instructed not to question Henry or
seek information from him.
24
The Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the court of appeals, 25
held that Henry's sixth amendment right had been violated because de-
liberate elicitation had occurred.26 The Court found three factors crucial
in determining that the government's behavior constituted deliberate
elicitation under Massiah.2 7 First, Nichols was to be paid only if he pro-
duced useful information. Thus, the government provided an attractive
incentive for Nichols to obtain a confession. 28 Second, Nichols was a
fellow inmate of Henry. The informant's appearance as a friend and ally
could lead a defendant to reveal incriminating information he would
never voluntarily reveal to a government agent. Moreover, the FBI was
aware that Nichols would easily be able to engage Henry in conversation
without arousing his suspicion.29 Third, Henry was in custody and
under indictment at the time he engaged in conversation with Nichols.
The Court observed that powerful psychological forces encourage a de-
fendant to seek aid while he is incarcerated: "[C]onfinement may bring
into play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to
the ploys of undercover Government agents." '30
The Supreme Court accepted the court of appeals' conclusion that
Nichols had "deliberately" used his position to obtain information from
Henry and that Nichols' conduct was attributable to the government.
The intentions of the FBI agent were irrelevant: even accepting the fact
that the agent did not intend for Nichols to take affirmative steps to se-
cure information, "he must have known that such propinquity likely
would lead to that result. ' 31 Finally, the Court determined that Nichols
was not a passive listener because he had engaged in conversations with
Henry and the incriminating statements were the product of these con-
24. Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 1978), afid, 447 U.S. 264 (1980)
(describing holding of district court); id. at 547 (Butzner, J., concurring) (same). The district court
also found that any constitutional violation would have constituted harmless error because other
evidence linked Henry to the crime. Id. at 547.
25. The court of appeals found that deliberate elicitation had occurred, even if there was no
direct questioning, because "association" or "general conversation" could constitute "interroga-
tion," Id. The court of appeals also rejected the district court's holding that any violation would
have been harmless error. Id.
26. 447 U.S. at 274.
27. Id. at 270.
28, Id. at 270-71.
29. Id. at 274 n.12.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 271.
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versations.3 2 The Court distinguished and reserved consideration of situ-
ations involving an electronic "listening post" or "the situation where an
informant is placed in close proximity but makes no effort to stimulate
conversations about the crime charged.1 33 Thus, the Court held that by
placing Henry in a cell with a paid government informant, with the logi-
cal result that the informant's presence would induce the defendant to
incriminate himself, the government had violated Henry's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel.34
B. Kuhlmann v. Wilson.35
Joseph Allan Wilson was arrested for the armed robbery of the Star
Taxicab Garage and murder of its dispatcher. Eyewitnesses identified
Wilson as having been present on the premises of the garage. Following
his arraignment, he was placed in a cell that overlooked the Star Taxicab
Garage. Benny Lee, his cellmate, had previously agreed to act as an in-
formant. The police directed Lee to listen to Wilson without asking any
questions. Wilson first brought up the crime after looking out the win-
dow and saying "Someone's messing with me." He initially provided Lee
with an exculpatory explanation, to which Lee replied that the story
"didn't sound too good." Wilson gave Lee varying accounts of the crime
over the next few days. Wilson eventually confessed to Lee after Wil-
son's brother visited him and mentioned that Wilson's family was upset
about the murder. Lee related his conversation with Wilson at trial.36
Wilson was tried in New York state court in 1972, eight years before
the Supreme Court decided Henry. 37 The trial court found that the in-
formant had followed police instructions not to ask Wilson any ques-
tions; Lee had only listened to Wilson's "spontaneous" and "unsolicited"
statements. The court thus concluded that the government's conduct did
not violate Wilson's constitutional rights and denied Wilson's motion to
suppress Lee's testimony. Wilson was later convicted. 38
32. Id. Under the agent's instructions to Nichols not to ask Henry any questions about the
robbery, "Nichols remained free to discharge his task of eliciting the statements in myriad less direct
ways." Id. at 271 n.8.
33. Id. at 271 n.9.
34. Id. at 274. The Court held, "By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to
make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id. The Court noted that the government did not litigate the
question of harmless error on appeal. Id. at 275 n.13.
35. 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
36. Id. at 2619-20.
37. Id. at 2620-21.
38, Id. at 2620.
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In 1973, Wilson sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. In 1978, that
court found no interrogation and thus no violation of Wilson's sixth
amendment right.39 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision.4°
Wilson again 4 sought a writ of habeas corpus in 1983, this time
asking for retroactive application of Henry. 42 The district court found
that Wilson's statements were "spontaneous," rather than elicited by the
government informant.43 The court held that the record of the state pro-
ceedings "plainly establishe[d]" both that the view of the taxicab garage
and a visit from Wilson's brother were the real catalysts of the incrimi-
nating statements and that Lee was simply a passive listener.44 The dis-
trict court denied the writ, finding that the state court factual
determinations distinguished the case from Henry. 45
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that under the standard of Henry, Lee was not a passive listener,
but instead part of a government plan which resulted in the deliberate
elicitation of a confession.46 The court of appeals focused on Lee's con-
duct and found that it was indistinguishable from the informant's con-
duct in Henry. The court explained that "[s]ubtly and slowly, but surely,
Lee's ongoing verbal intercourse with Wilson served to exacerbate Wil-
son's already troubled state of mind."47 The court held that these cir-
cumstances constituted deliberate elicitation under Massiah and
Williams. 48
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision.4 9 It held
39. Id.
40. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1192 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945 (1979).
41. Henry was decided by the Supreme Court in 1980. In 1981, Wilson filed a motion in state
court to vacate his conviction. That motion was denied by the state trial court, which found both
that Henry was factually distinguishable because the informant had been paid and that Henry was
not subject to retroactive application. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621.
42. Wilson v. Henderson, No. 82 Civ. 4397 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1983), reprinted in Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari app. C, at 24a, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986) (No. 84-1479).
43. Id., reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. C, at 28a. The district court did not
articulate its reason for hearing the second habeas corpus petition.
44. Id.
45. Id., reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. C, at 28a-29a. In light of this conclu-
sion, the court did not reach the issue of whether Henry would be retroactively applicable. Id.,
reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. C, at 27a n.3.
46. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 744-45 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
The court of appeals found that the "ends ofjustice" entitled Wilson to a second habeas petition. Id.
at 743 (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963)). The court also found that Henry was
to be applied retroactively. Id. at 747.
47. Id. at 745.
48. Id.
49. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2631 (1986).
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that because the appellate court's description of the interaction between
Lee and Wilson "conflict[ed] with the decision of every other state and
federal judge who reviewed this record," the panel had failed to follow
the habeas statute's factfinding provision applicable to state prisoners,
section 2254(d).50 Stating that it was deferring to the state court finding
of fact, the Supreme Court found that the government had instructed the
informant "only to listen to respondent for the purpose of determining
the identities of the other participants in the robbery and murder. '51
The Court found that the case presented the question left open in
Henry:52 whether a jailhouse informant may be "placed in close proxim-
ity [who] makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged."' 53 Such conduct, the Court concluded, is permissible.54 To
prove a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, the defendant
must show that the "police and their informant took some action, beyond
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating re-
marks. ' 55 The Supreme Court ruled that because the state court findings
showed that the agent had followed his instructions, the government had
not violated Wilson's sixth amendment right.56
II. RECONCILIATION OF HENRY AND WILSON
A. Wilson and Henry are Not Constitutionally Distinguishable.
The Supreme Court reached disparate results in Wilson and Henry,
although the two cases presented the Court with virtually identical fac-
tual situations. The Supreme Court's finding that the two cases are con-
stitutionally distinguishable is problematic. The three factors identified
in Henry as critical to establishing deliberate elicitation were also present
in Wilson, and the minor factual differences found by the Court do not
show that Lee was a passive listener.
Wilson satisfies the three-factor test established in Henry:57 Lee was
a paid government informant; he lived in the same cellblock with Wilson;
and Wilson was under the subtle influences brought about by confine-
ment. Furthermore, the facts in Wilson indicate deliberate elicitation
even more clearly than did the facts in Henry. In Henry, the informant
50. Id. Section 2254(d) is reprinted at text accompanying note 85.
51. 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
52. Id. at 2628.
53. Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
54. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2628.
55. Id. at 2630.
56. Id. at 2630-31.
57. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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already shared a cell with the defendant,58 while in Wilson, the govern-
ment placed Wilson in the informant's cell, which overlooked the site of
the robbery.5 9 Thus, the government's conduct was more deliberate and
coercive in Wilson than it was in Henry.
The Court held that, based on the state court findings, Lee acted
only as a passive listener.60 Wilson, however, could not have presented
the passive informant "listening post" question left open in Henry. 61 The
factual similarity of the two cases and Lee's lack of passivity preclude
this solution. Both informants were instructed to listen to the defendants
and not to stimulate conversation about the crimes charged. Although
they engaged in conversation with the defendants, both were said to have
followed these instructions. 62 In Henry, the informant's actual words
were not dispositive; the totality of the government's behavior established
deliberate elicitation.63 Wilson and Lee engaged in conversation, just as
Henry and Nichols did, and as their relationship developed, Wilson
could have been lulled into a false sense of security that led to confession.
Clearly, Lee was not passive when he replied to Wilson's first, exculpa-
tory account of the crime that the story "didn't sound too good." 64
Thus, Lee and the police in Wilson were no more passive than Nichols
and the police were in Henry.
The Supreme Court, attempting to distinguish Wilson, noted that
the agent was employed for the purpose of determining the identities of
Wilson's accomplices. The police did not intend for Lee to elicit self-
incriminating information because they already had solid evidence of
Wilson's guilt.65 The Court did not explain the significance of the police
officers' intent.6 6 Intent should not be considered a controlling factor in
analysis of possible deliberate elicitation. Henry does not require specific
intent on the part of the government; it supports a finding of deliberate
58. Henry, 447 U.S. at 266.
59. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619.
60. Id. at 2630.
61. Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9.
62. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630; see Henry, 447 U.S. at 271. The Henry majority refers to Nich-
ols'. behavior in an active light, although there is no explicit finding of active interrogation. See
Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 ("[A]ccording to his own testimony, Nichols was not a passive listener;
rather he had 'some conversations with Mr. Henry'...." (quoting Nichols' trial testimony)); id. at
274 ("[I]ncriminating conversations between Henry and Nichols were facilitated by Nichols' con-
duct .... ). On the other hand, in its brief review of the state court findings, the Wilson Court
merely noted that Lee" 'only listened' " to Wilson's "'spontaneous' "and "'unsolicited'" remarks.
106 S. Ct. at 2630.
63. 447 U.S. at 270-71, 274-75.
64. See 106 S. Ct. at 2630. Under Henry, any informant who engages in "general conversa-
tion" about the crime cannot be considered a passive listener. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 270-71.
65. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
66. See id. at 2630-31.
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elicitation even if the government did not intend to elicit a confession
from Wilson where they should have known that such "propinquity
likely would lead to that result. ' 67 The Supreme Court deferred to the
state court finding that Wilson's statements were "'spontaneous'" and
"'unsolicited.' ",68 But, as the dissent argued, even if Lee's actions were
not the immediate cause of Wilson's admission, "the deliberate elicitation
standard requires consideration of the entire course of government be-
havior."' 69 The acts of placing Wilson in a cell overlooking the garage
and allowing a visit from his brother support a finding of deliberate elici-
tation, because the police should have known that the result would likely
be a confession of guilt.
B. Reconciliation of Wilson and Henry.
The Supreme Court's disposition of Wilson may cause confusion in
the lower courts. Because the cases appear factually indistinguishable, 70
one might read Wilson to overrule Henry. Courts that accept the
Supreme Court's assertion that Henry remains intact7' will have diffi-
culty determining the standard for deliberate elicitation. Moreover, law
enforcement agencies may be left with inconsistent rules for avoiding
constitutional violations. Henry demands that a court assess the totality
of the government's behavior,72 while Wilson could be read as establish-
ing a more stringent test for deliberate elicitation.73
67. Henry, 447 U.S. at 271. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
68. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
69. Id. at 2639 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The State intentionally created a situation in which it
was forseeable [sic] that respondent would make incriminating statements without the assistance of
counsel ....").
70. A number of judges have decided that Henry and Wilson are factually indistinguishable.
Wilson was convicted before Henry's habeas petition was heard by the Supreme Court. The Fourth
Circuit granted Henry's habeas petition shortly after the Second Circuit denied Wilson's first, unsuc-
cessful habeas petition. In his dissent in Henry, Judge Russell of the Fourth Circuit wrote of Wilson:
"It is evident that factually this case is on all-fours with our case and that the legal issue is precisely
the same." Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Wilson, 584 F.2d 1185,
1191 (2d Cir. 1978)), aff'd, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). In his dissent from the denial of rehearing of
Wilson's first habeas petition, Judge Oakes noted that the Fourth Circuit had in Henry "held on the
Massiah point directly contrary to the panel majority in this case." 590 F.2d 408, 409 (2d Cir. 1978)
(citing Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978)). The government argued at one point
that Wilson and Henry were indistinguishable. See United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 637-38
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting government position, held prior to Supreme Court decision in Henry, that
circumstances of Wilson and Henry were "virtually identical"). Finally, two Supreme Court Justices
found sufficient factual similarities between the two cases for Wilson to be governed by Henry. See
Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2637-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
71. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2628-30.
72. Henry, 447 U.S. at 270-71.
73. One could read Wilson as having limited the deliberate elicitation standards set out in
Henry. Because the Court never addressed the three factors that it cited as crucial in Henry, one
could read this as a discarding of the test. Deliberate elicitation could then be seen as requiring more
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The Supreme Court's holding in Wilson turned on a procedural is-
sue-the court of appeals' failure to pay due deference to the state court's
factual findings.74 For the Supreme Court in Wilson, those factual find-
ings precluded identifying a constitutional violation. The Court did not
even address the three factors75 it had cited as crucial in Henry. The
court of appeals' conclusion, according to the Supreme Court, "was
based on a fundamental mistake, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to
accord to the state trial court's factual findings the presumption of cor-
rectness expressly required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)."'76
In Henry, the Court never discussed factfinding; it simply attacked
the constitutional issues.7 7 Beciuse Henry involved review of a federal
conviction, section 2254(d) did not apply, and the Court was not strictly
bound by the trial court's findings of fact.
The most satisfactory reconciliation of Henry and Wilson is to read
the first as a case about constitutional protection and the second as a case
about factfinding under the federal habeas statute. Under this approach,
Henry establishes the standard for finding deliberate elicitation, while
Wilson establishes the standard for federal court review of state court
convictions. 78
III. THE DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING SECTION 2254(D) TO
INFORMANT CASES
A. The History and Purposes of Section 2254(d).
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) in 1966.79 The chairman of
the Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, which sponsored the legislation, stated that the bill's pur-
pose was "to prevent the abuse of the writ... and to expedite the disposi-
tion of nonmeritorious and repetitious applications for the writ in
inducement on the part of the informant than merely engaging in general conversation about the
crime charged. The Court, however, never said it was dispensing with the reasoning in Henry;
rather, as this note argues, the Court directed its energies toward the procedural issues and buried
the deliberate elicitation issue in the background.
74. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
75. Henry, 447 U.S. at 270-71.
76. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
77. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 269-75.
78. If a state court were to find deliberate elicitation under the Henry standard, Wilson would
support that conclusion on review. It is only when a federal court is inclined to overturn a state
court conviction that Wilson would play a significant role. Thus, the substance of the Henry deliber-
ate elicitation standard remains intact, but federal courts inclined to overturn state court convictions
are unable to apply it.
79. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, § 2, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1104, 1105.
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Federal courts by State court prisoners."80 The legislation was intended
to lessen the increasing burden that meritless habeas petitions imposed
on federal courts81 and to encourage state courts to safeguard the consti-
tutional rights of defendants. 12 The legislation also was intended to mini-
mize the friction between state and federal courts. 83 The goals of the
legislation were to be attained by according a presumption of correctness
to factual determinations made at hearings on the merits by state
courts.
4
B. Questions of Law and Fact Under Section 2254(d).
The application of section 2254(d) is problematic because a federal
court must distinguish between issues of fact, issues of law, and mixed
questions of fact and law. Section 2254(d) provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a
factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a pro-
ceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer
or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written
opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be pre-
sumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit .... 85
80. S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs 3663, 3666 (letter from Judge Orie L. Phillips to Sen. Joseph D. Tydings (Sept. 24, 1966)).
81. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 3664.
82. See id. at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3665 ('"[T]he pro-
posed legislation... will be a strong inducement.., to the State courts in criminal proceedings to
safeguard the constitutional rights of defendants.'" (quoting Report of the Committee on Habeas
Corpus to the Judicial Conference of the United States)).
83. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981) ("Federal habeas has been a source of friction
between state and federal courts, and Congress obviously meant to alleviate some of that friction
when it enacted subsection (d) in 1966 .... ").
84. S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3663, 3664-65.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). Exceptions to the presumption are:
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford
a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the
applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitu-
tional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court
proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determina-
tion of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter,
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The general rule is that the phrase "issues of fact" refers to "what are
termed basic, primary, or historical facts: facts 'in the sense of a recital
of external events and the credibility of their narrators.' ",s6 When the
result in a case turns on a factual finding that clearly requires the applica-
tion of standards 6f law, the presumption of correctness normally given
to findings of fact does not apply.s7
Sumner v. Mata, Il the landmark case in the area of habeas review of
state court factfinding, involved the distinction between factual and legal
issues in the area of pretrial identification procedures.8 9 This decision
illustrates the confusion surrounding the Supreme Court's interpretation
of section 2254(d). The Supreme Court initially ruled that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had failed to properly af-
ford the presumption of correctness to the state court factfinding. 90 On
remand, the court of appeals contended that because its disagreement
with the state court involved the constitutional significance of certain
facts, section 2254(d) was inapplicable. 91 On a second grant of certiorari,
the Supreme Court held that although the ultimate constitutional ques-
tion was a "mixed question of fact and law that is not governed by
§ 2254(d)," all underlying factual findings had to be accorded the pre-
sumption of correctness. 92 The Court vacated and remanded the case
because some of the court of appeals' findings differed from those of the
and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes
that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record ....
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
86. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506
(1953) (Frankfurter, J.) (separate opinion on the bearing of state court proceedings on application
for writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court)); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-
42 (1980) (whether counsel undertook multiple representations is mixed question not entitled to
presumption of correctness under section 2254(d)).
87. See Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286 n.16 (1982).
88. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) [hereinafter Mata 1]; Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591
(1982) (per curiam) [hereinafter Mata I].
89. Mata II, 455 U.S. at 597.
90. Mata , 449 U.S. at 547. The Court ordered the court of appeals to either apply the pre-
sumption of correctness or set forth the reasons why it was led to conclude that the finding was "not
fairly supported by the record." Id. at 551. Justice Brennan argued in dissent:
It is cruelly ironic that the Court would hold the constitutionality of pretrial identification
procedures to be a question of law when the effect is to vacate a decision in favor of a
prisoner ... but would reject the same conclusion when the effect would be to vindicate
such a prisoner's constitutional rights.
Id. at 558.
91. The court of appeals concluded that section 2254(d) did not apply because the disagreement
with the state court was "over the legal and constitutionial significance of certain facts." Mata v.
Sumner, 649 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1981). The court found that whether a pretrial photographic
identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive was a mixed question not entitled to the pre-
sumption of correctness. Id. at 717.
92. Mata II, 455 U.S. at 597. The Supreme Court asserted that the court of appeals must have
"misunderstood [the] remand." Id. at 596-97.
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state court. 93
Wilson presents an example of the problems with the Supreme
Court's application of section 2254(d). The Supreme Court held in Wil-
son that the court of appeals failed to pay proper deference to the trial
court's findings of fact.94 The Court failed, however, to recognize that
deliberate elicitation is a mixed question of fact and law.95 Whether de-
93. Id. at 598.
94. 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2630 (1986).
95. Since the Mata decisions, the Court has further blurred the distinction between law and
fact, reaching confusing results. For example, in Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983), the
voluntariness of a guilty plea was at issue. The Court held that the court of appeals, which found the
plea to be involuntary, failed to apply the presumption of correctness to the state court findings. Id.
at 430-33. The Court noted that the federal court of appeals had described its own holding as
"'directly contrary to the conclusions of both the Ohio courts that considered the question.'" Id. at
431 (quoting Lonberger v. Jago, 651 F.2d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 1981)).
In Marshall, the issue in the petition for habeas corpus was whether the defendant's guilty plea
was voluntary. Id. at 428. The defendant testified at trial that he did not have knowledge of all the
charges against him when he pleaded guilty. Id. at 433 (citing Lonberger, 651 F.2d at 449-50). The
Court held that the trial court necessarily could not have believed the defendant; had the "trial court
credited respondent's insistence that he had only been advised of or been aware of the battery
charge," the court would have disallowed the admission of a previous attempted murder conviction.
Id. at 433-34. But as the dissent pointed out, even if the defendant knew he was "charged with
attempted murder, it does not necessarily follow that he knew he was pleading guilty to attempted
murder." Id. at 443 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, the findings of fact by the state court simply
failed to resolve the case.
Rhetoric similar to that used by the Court in Marshall appears in other opinions overturning
appellate decisions. In each case the Supreme Court pointed out that the court of appeals had
reached a different result from all the other courts that considered the question. In Rushen v. Spain,
464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983), the Court held that a state court's ruling regarding a juror's impartiality is
no different from any other factual determination for the purpose of applying section 2254(d). The
dissent argued that the determination of this question was tantamount to determination of the fed-
eral question of constitutional error. Id. at 142 n.22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Despite the fact that
juror impartiality is a "complex and important federal question," the majority vacated the appellate
court decision without the benefit of briefing by the parties. Id.
Following Rushen, the Court, in Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984), held that whether a
juror could be impartial in the face of pretrial publicity was not a mixed question of law and fact, but
one of simple historical fact: did the juror swear that he could ignore any opinion he held, and was
his protestation of impartiality credible. Id. at 1036. While admitting that both factual and legal
findings determine whether a juror is qualified, id. at 1037 n.12, the Court insisted that a determina-
tion ofjuror impartiality is entitled to a presumption of correctness, id. at 1038. Again the dissent is
convincing: Justice Stevens argued that while a witness's truthfulness is a question of fact, whether
his statement raises a presumption of partiality is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at 1050 n.6
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1879)).
The fact that legal determinations are at odds with the lower courts should be irrelevant. The
Supreme Court should not be concerned with the ultimate conclusions reached by the lower courts;
the appellate court should defer only to the factual determinations of the lower courts.
Commentators have expressed confusion and dismay over the Court's application of section
2254(d). See, e.g., Nichol, Backing into the Future: The Burger Court and the Federal Forum, 30 U.
KAN. L. REV. 341, 357-59 (1982) (The Supreme Court's application of section 2254(d) has limited
federal courts' inquiries into the accuracy and constitutional significance of state courts' factual de-
terminations.); Pagano, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Present and Future, 49 ALB, L.
REV. 1, 28-30 (1984) (The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of section 2254(d) may abridge the
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:945
liberate elicitation occurred depends on the activities of the government
and its agent. Their conduct is clearly a question of fact, while the con-
stitutional and legal significance of that conduct should be viewed as a
question of law. The state court found that Lee did not ask any questions
of Wilson and that his statements were spontaneous and unsolicited.96
-Accepting this, the court of appeals found that deliberate elicitation had
occurred under the standards of Henry and Massiah.97 The appellate
court did not disregard the factflnding of the state court, but merely
characterized the facts differently, drawing different legal conclusions. 98
Because "deliberate elicitation" should be characterized as a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact, the Court should not have applied section 2254(d)'s
presumption of correctness.
C. Secondary Considerations in Habeas Corpus Review.
Legitimate but misplaced considerations may have colored the
Supreme Court's application of section 2254(d). The Court has demon-
strated an interest in finality99 and a reluctance to overturn a state court
power of federal courts to review state court convictions.); Reynolds, Sumner v. Mata: Twilight's
Last Gleaming for Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions? Speculations on the
Future of the Great Writ, 4 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 289, 291-92, 296, 298 (1981) (The Supreme
Court's hostility toward the writ of habeas corpus demonstrated by its use of procedural mechanisms
like section 2254(d) may destroy the writ's vitality for testing constitutionality of state court
convictions.).
The Supreme Court's approach to section 2254(d) has also confused the courts of appeals.
Since the Mata decisions, courts have treated many issues as legal that the Supreme Court might
now characterize as factual. See, e.g., Smith v. Perini, 723 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1983) (Whether identi-
fication violated due process is a legal question entitled to full review.), cert denied, 466 U.S. 941
(1984); Unitea States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 444 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1982) (Whether
defendant established in habeas corpus petition sufficient evidence that the state had offered him a
plea bargain is a legal question.); United States ex rel. Scarpelli v. George, 687 F.2d 1012, 1015 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Whether sixth amendment right of confrontation was violated is a mixed question not
governed by the presumption of correztness.); Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1368-69 (1 1th
Cir.) (Whether statements were sufficiently definite to constitute a request for a continuance is at
least a mixed question and not entitled to presumption of correctness.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878
(1982); Panzavecchia v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 337, 339 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (lssue of prejudice is at
least a mixed question and is not entitled to presumption of correctness.).
96, Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2620.
97. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 744-45 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra notes 46-48 and
accompanying text. The court noted that prior decisions in the case had been rendered before Henry
was decided. 742 F.2d at 747.
98. Justice Brennan's dissent in Mata 11 addressed a similar situation. He argued that there
was no reason for disbelieving the court of appeals' insistence that it had accepted the factual find-
ings of the state court. That court had simply disagreed with "'the legal and constitutional signifi-
cance of certain facts.'" Mata II, 455 U.S. at 600 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 649 F.2d 713,
716 (Ninth Circuit's opinion on remand from Mata 1)).
99. In Mata I, the Court discussed the issue of finality as a footnote to its analysis of the fact/
law distinction: Section 2254(d) ensures that for the benefit of both the individual criminal defend-
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conviction of an "actually guilty" defendant.100 These concerns may
have affected its assessment of the distinction between fact and law.
A determination that the critical issue in a case such as Wilson is a
factual one reduces the chances that a habeas applicant will prevail. The
federal courts may be powerless to review state court convictions. Curi-
ously, this approach leaves the final constitutional determination in the
hands of the state court. In a jailhouse informant case, if a state court
finds that a confession is voluntary and not deliberately elicited, a federal
court cannot find a constitutional violation unless it decides that the state
court's factual determinations are not "fairly supported by the rec-
ord." 101 The federal court is stripped of its power to interpret the legal
significance of facts. Whenever the state court in a jailhouse informant
case says the magic words, that is, that the defendant's statements were
"unsolicited" or "spontaneous," the federal court will be compelled to
agree that there has been no constitutional violation.
The Supreme Court's disposition of Wilson was not compelled by
any indisputable meaning of the word "fact." A malleable word such as
"fact" does not control the judicial process. "Fact" will mean what the
Court says it means whenever the definition persuades a majority of the
ant and society "there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation." 449
U.S. at 550 n.3; see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-27 (1982).
100. See, e.g., Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2627 (Federal courts should entertain habeas petitions "only
where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual inno-
cence."); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-27 & n.31 (1982) (" '[T]he proverbial man from Mars
would surely think we must consider our system of criminal justice terribly bad if we are willing to
tolerate such efforts at undoing judgments of conviction.'" (quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 142, 145 (1970))). In Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court ruled that federal habeas review would be unavailable to state
prisoners who claimed fourth amendment search and seizure violations unless the defendant could
show that the state failed to provide "an opportunity for full and fair litigation." Id at 494. The
Court found the prisoner's constitutional rights to be outweighed by other costs to society, such as
diversion at trial from the "ultimate question of guilt or innocence" and exclusion of probative and
reliable evidence. Id. at 489-90. The Court added that a convicted defendant making this claim was
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[d] no bearing on the basic justice of his
incarceration." Id. at 492 n.31.
Much has been written on the Supreme Court's strong interest in finality and actual guilt. See,
e.g., Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only for the Arguably Inno-
cent?, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 291, 325-29 (1977) (Imposing a threshold of innocence for federal habeas
corpus relief would subordinate due process values to interests in finality and guilt determination.);
Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate
Balance, 12 HOFSrRA L. REV. 617 (1984) (Neither Congress nor society supports the Supreme
Court's preference for finality over certainty that a conviction is just.); Note, The Burger Court
Limits of Habeas Corpus Review: Which Path to Follow-Procedural Hurdles or Fundamental Fair-
ness?, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (1983) (Recent decisions highlight the Supreme Court's empha-
sis on finality of judgment and conviction of the guilty.).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1982) (factual determinations presumed to be correct unless not
fairly supported by the record). This note assumes none of the other exceptions to section 2254(d)
apply. See supra note 85 for the text of the exceptions.
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justices. But such a meaning must be ascertained within a specific histor-
ical and political context. The merits of a litigant's contention, or the
substantive issues at stake, color any interpretation; the Justices cannot
operate in a vacuum or discount the beliefs that comprise the machinery
of their minds. Goals, values, and prejudices will determine what "fact"
means; the text is without the armament to fight back.102
If the Court has finality and actual guilt in mind when assessing the
fact/law issue, it seems possible that such concerns would infect the
thought processes of the Justices. This is not to imply that the Supreme
Court is deliberately misconstruing the fact/law distinction; it merely
suggests that other concern, may affect how the Court draws the fine line
between questions of fact and law.103 When, as in Wilson, it is difficult
rationally to justify a decision by looking solely at the analysis presented
in the case, one must look elsewhere. 04
102. See generally Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary
Criticism, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATON 271, 281 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983) (Interpretation is
not constrained by "what is obviously and unproblematically 'there,' nor [is it] the case that inter-
preters ... are free to read into a text whatever they like .... Interpreters are constrained by their
tacit awareness of... what will and will not be heard as evidence in a given enterprise.").
103. This is also not to suggest that after considering the political consequences of a choice, the
Justices choose one interpretation of "fact" over another; the point is that the Justices as interpreters
can perceive the text only from the historical, judicial and political context that imprisons them. See
generally Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 281, 289 (1982)
(belief structures are historically contingent); Michaels, Is There a Politics of Interpretation?, in THE
POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 335, 344 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983) ("[T]he whole project of conceiving
interpretations as chosen is incoherent .... ").
104. In Wilson, four Justices found that Wilson's second habeas petition should not have been
heard because he had not made a colorable showing of innocence. Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, argued that under section 2244(b), the statute
governing successive review of state prisoners' claims, federal courts should entertain new habeas
petitions for cases which have previously been heard by federal courts only "where the prisoner
supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence." Wilson, 106 S.
Ct. at 2627. The defendant cannot make a colorable showing of innocence by demonstrating that he
might not have been convicted had the unconstitutional evidence not been admitted. Id at 2627
n. 17. Instead he must show that in light of all the evidence, including the evidence in question, the
trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Id. This approach, Justice
Powell argued, serves the important goal of finality that Congress had in mind when it enacted the
1966 amendments to section 2244. Id. at 2626.
Not surprisingly, the four Justices who would have denied the second habeas petition comprised
part of the majority of six that held that the court of appeals failed to pay proper deference to the
state court findings of fact. Id. at 2630-31. The result of both approaches advocated by these four
Justices would be that an "actually guilty" defendant would remain in prison and not further burden
the federal courts with habeas petitions. If the Court were applying procedural statutes neutrally,
divorced from political or social concerns, it would not necessarily follow that the Justices who
sought to deny rehearing would be the same as those who insisted on blind reliance on the state
court's findings. But in Wilson, the Justices who were inclined to use one procedural weapon to
reach a given result found a different procedural weapon to justify the same result. The supposed
advantage of procedural as opposed to substantive rules is that procedural rules can be applied
"neutrally," divorced from the political issues inherent in the substantive elements of a case. The
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D. Impact of the Supreme Court's Application of Section 2254(d).
The Supreme Court's approach to section 2254(d) denigrates federal
court supremacy. Under the principles of federalism articulated in sec-
tion 2254(d), federal courts should not disturb a supportable factual find-
ing of a state court.105 But when there is an issue of constitutional law,
federalism does not impair the federal court's jurisdiction. As Justice
Brennan remarked, "A federal court need not-indeed, must not-defer
to the state court's interpretation of federal law."10 6 The Wilson and
Mata line of decisions creates uncertainty as to the federal courts' power
to inquire into legal issues; state courts are left with the final word on
critical constitutional questions. As Justice Marshall wrote, "If federal
courts are obliged to defer to state-court findings of this order, the capac-
ity of the federal courts through habeas proceedings to remedy depriva-
tions of constitutional rights in state criminal trials will be substantially
undercut."10 7 Section 2254(d) clearly was not intended to interfere so
drastically with the power of the federal courts.10
8
Protecting criminal defendants from the kind of government intru-
sion encountered in Henry is vital to the criminal justice system. The
sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the "right to rely on
counsel as the 'medium' between himself and the State."10 9 The sixth
amendment, therefore, "'imposes on the State an affirmative obligation
to respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek [the assistance of
counsell.' "110 This right is violated when the state secures incriminating
information from the defendant by knowingly circumventing his right to
have counsel present in a confrontation between the defendant and a gov-
Supreme Court plurality's procedural maneuvers in Wilson suggest otherwise. As Ronald Dworkin
has said, "The flight from substance must end in substance." Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 516 (1981) (arguing against theories that judicial review avoids "trespassing on
democracy"). See generally Gordon, supra note 103, at 284 (Procedural rules are not "a set of
neutral techniques available to anyone who could seize control of its levers and pulleys.").
105. Mata , 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981) (Federalism interest in section 2254(d) "requires defer-
ence by federal courts to factual determinations of all state courts.").
106. Id. at 559 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Note, Stone v. Powell and the New Federalism: A
Challenge to Congress, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 152, 168 (1976) ("In a federal system premised on the
supremacy of federal law, some federal supervision of the state courts in their determination of
federal constitutional claims is necessary.").
107. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 142 n.22 (1983) (Marshall, ., dissenting). Rushen was
decided after the Mata decisions and before Wilson. The majority held that the "substance of the ex-
parte communications and their effect on juror impartiality are questions of historical fact.... Thus,
they must be determined, in the first instance, by state courts and deferred to, in the absence of
'convincing evidence' to the contrary, by the federal courts." Id. at 120.
108. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
109. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2637 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Maine
v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
110. Id. (quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. at 485).
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ernment agent. As the Court held in Henry, the government's use of a
jailhouse informant robs the defendant of vital constitutional rights.
While under the mental and physical strains of custody, he is housed
with a fellow cellmate whose job it is to secure incriminating information
from him. If the informant entices the defendant to confess, his actions
should be regarded as a surreptitious form of interrogation.
The jailhouse informant situation is far more ripe for abuse than
ordinary interrogation in a police station, and hence the defendant has an
even greater need for protection. At the police station, the defendant at
least knows he is being interrogated. In the jailhouse, however, the gov-
ernment is extracting a confession from the defendant that he does not
expect to be used against him. The Supreme Court in Henry rightly
sought to discourage this type of reprehensible police behavior."' Prece-
dent has established that the accused has a vital right to have counsel
present at interrogations; '1 2 this must continue to be read to include indi-
rect and surreptitious interrogation as well as the more formal police in-
terrogations. In Wilson, the Court did not protect the defendant's rights
because the Court failed to recognize that deliberate elicitation is a legal
conclusion subject to federal review.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long protected the sixth amendment right
to counsel. In United States v. Henry, the Court sought to preserve those
rights in the jailhouse informant context. Six years later, in Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, the Court sent confusing signals to the lower courts concerning
the vitality of those rights. Wilson on its face could be read as overturn-
ing or limiting Henry. But the Supreme Court relied on Henry and did
not explicitly reverse it.
This note has argued that the two decisions can be reconciled by
reading Henry as a decision about jailhouse informants and Wilson as a
111. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273-74 (1980). This police behavior appears particu-
larly odious when one considers the relationship that the police exploit. To succeed at his job, an
informant must gain the confidence of the criminal defendant; within the powerful confines of a
prison environment, the informant must deceptively become the defendant's friend. Once the in-
formant lulls his "friend" into a false sense of security, the defendant can speak candidly of his
behavior. In the presence of his friend, the defendant feels as comfortable as he would if he were
talking to himself. As Francis Bacon wrote, "a friend is another himself." Bacon, On Friendship, in
THE GREAT THOUGHTS 28 (G. Seldes ed. 1985). Accepting this, one could argue that the police
behavior condemned in Henry but permitted in Wilson comes dangerously close to violating the
defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Furthermore, confessions obtained
through indirect and surreptitious interrogations not only interfere with the defendant's constitu-
tional rights, but are also unreliable. An informant has a powerful incentive to lie or distort the
truth, and his credibility is inherently suspect; he has nothing to lose.
112. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
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decision about the standards for habeas review of state court convictions.
Thus, lower courts can both freely apply the standards of deliberate elici-
tation articulated in Henry and attempt to apply the standards of review
articulated in Wilson. This note has also pointed out, however, that the
Supreme Court's misapplication of 2254(d) to mixed questions of fact
and law, such as deliberate elicitation, makes it difficult for lower courts
to follow its demands. Furthermore, as a result of the Supreme Court's
disposition of Henry and Wilson, federal courts are left with waning au-
thority to overturn state court convictions when they perceive constitu-
tional violations. The Supreme Court has relieved the federal courts of
the burden of reviewing certain legal questions-and has also, perhaps,
relieved them from the burden of achieving justice.
Louis D. Lappen
